

SECRET

30 August 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence


FROM: SA/DCI/IA

SUBJECT: Your Break fast Meeting with Secretary Weinberger,
Secretary Shultz, and Bud McFarlane, 31 August 1984

1. In place of your normal break fast meeting with Secretary Weinberger, there will be a break fast session of the Big Four. As you know, this meeting was called to discuss concerns about Iran.

2. As per Bob Gates' instructions, I have had talking points prepared for you that address three subjects:

-- The internal situation today in Iran. (TAB A)



25X1

3. You are scheduled for a pre-brief on this subject today, Thursday, at 3:15 p.m., in your OEGB office. In attendance will be Bob Gates, [redacted] I will not attend this pre-brief-- [redacted] will stand in--so that I can continue work on your NSPG package.

25X1

25X1

4. As it now stands, Bob Gates is accompanying you since, as I understand it, you apparently intend to take up other subjects with Secretary Weinberger in addition to the subject of Iran. [redacted]



Note!
Secretary Shultz, I am now told, will be bringing
Hugh Montgomery
and
D/PM

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

DCI Talking Points
30 August 1984Iranian Internal Political Situation

After nearly six years in power the Iranian network of clerical institutions and instruments of repression is too well entrenched to unravel quickly if Ayatollah Khomeini were to die or become incapacitated. There are deep divisions within the clerical community, even among Khomeini loyalists, but they all agree on the need for continued strong clerical control.

- Clerical factions that support the regime argue over the degree of social, political, and economic change that is needed.
- Pragmatics who in the past had supported many radical policies now seem to be advocating moderation.
- Although many clerics strongly oppose any clerical involvement in politics, they are unlikely to challenge the regime.
- The security forces are strong and loyal to the clerics.
- Discontent among Iran's ethnic minorities is unlikely to become a threat to the central government.
- Neither the Shah's son nor any other Iranian exile leader has the necessary domestic assets to shape Iran's political future.

Nevertheless, popular discontent over economic hardships, the costs of continuing the war with Iraq, and the Islamicization of daily life is growing and is causing the regime to tilt toward more moderate policies.

- Over the past year, Iranians have become more willing to take to the streets to protest government policies, widespread corruption, and the frequent brutality of local officials.
- Some demonstrations have been encouraged by one or another of the half dozen senior ayatollahs--equal to Khomeini in religious authority--who are critical of his government.

Despite his declining health, Khomeini remains the linchpin of the regime. He contains clerical infighting and gives legitimacy to the regime as no other Iranian leader can.

This paper is classified SECRET in its entirety.

25X1
25X1

SECRET

25X1

25X1

If Khomeini were to die suddenly, a quick decision to tap Ayatollah Hosein Montazeri is likely. Long considered Khomeini's preferred heir, Montazeri was endorsed in July by Consultative Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, Iran's second most powerful political leader.

- Without Khomeini, no one will have the stature to contain the endemic infighting among the clerics. Rafsanjani's endorsement, for example, appears to stem largely from his expectation that Montazeri can be manipulated.
- Real power is likely to be wielded by other senior government and religious leaders, such as President Khamenei, Rafsanjani, and Ayatollahs Meshkini, Musavi-Ardabili, and Mahdavi-Kani. (See Graphic attached)

Over the short term, the clerical regime is likely to survive Khomeini's passing or incapacitation. It will probably continue most of the policies he has blessed, although some in the regime will look for a way out of the war.

- In the long run, however, clerical rivalries are likely to grow and may become uncontrollable. The stability of the Iranian government would then be seriously threatened--especially if the armed forces become involved in the struggles among the clerics.

Page Denied

B

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

C

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

D

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied